

THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS  
ARE ATTACHED:  
(Please do not remove)

ER 0610 88

B4E 3873 88

SUBJECT:

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Our Ability to Protect Sensitive US Industrial Capabilities

FROM:

Joseph B. Castillo, Jr.

EXTENSION

STAT  
STAT

DATE / 25 February 1988

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

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OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.  
DCI Registry

20 FEB 1988

ML

2.  
DDCI

28 FEB

RG

(SEE Note)

3. J. Castillo  
C/ACIS

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ER 0610-88

12 February 1988

NOTE TO: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff  
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

The attached has been passed to me by a very experienced and senior member of several DoD advisory panels. I suspect that what he says is true, that is, there is no one on the arms control delegations with a comprehensive knowledge of US defense and intelligence contractor installations and thus in a position to advise the negotiators. [redacted]

25X1

I would appreciate your pursuing this, perhaps at a SACG, by seeing if there is not a need for such a person either in the delegation or in the arms control loop here in Washington. Let me know what you find out. [redacted]

25X1

*Re*  
Robert M. Gates

Attachment:  
As Stated

Orig - Adse  
1 - DDCI  
1 - ER



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A matter as potentially serious as this one should be brought to the attention of the SecDef, the DCI, and the NSC Adviser. The most obvious solution would be to assign one person to the Geneva Start team who has the requisite background to protect National Intelligence and Security interests during the preparation of position papers and in the actual drafting of the START treaty and protocols.